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INTRODUCTION
In January 2007, President Iajuddin Ahmed declared a state
of emergency in Bangladesh amidst violent street protests over
feared vote-rigging in the run-up to planned elections. 1 A
military-backed interim government ruled Bangladesh for most
of the next two years on a platform aimed at cleaning up the
country’s democratic institutions through an ambitious
anticorruption program.2
The military takeover in Bangladesh capped a decade of
“good governance” coups in South and Southeast Asia, where
militaries justified their interventions on the basis of widespread
frustration with incompetent and corrupt political leaders.3 Two
other prominent examples were Pakistan and Thailand. General
Pervez Musharraf came to power in Pakistan in 1999, after
deposing Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who led an
unpopular government marred by graft and ineffective
governance. 4 In 2006, the Thai military pushed President
Thaksin Shinawatra into exile amidst street demonstrations over
the President’s allegedly heavy-handed rule, vote-buying, and
improper sale of his telecommunications company.5
In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Thailand, the supposed
corruption of democratically elected leaders was not only used
as one of the primary justifications for the military-backed
takeover, but also as an instrument for sustaining it. These
military-backed governments claimed that corruption had to be
1. See President Declares State of Emergency, UNITED NEWS OF BANGL., Jan. 11, 2007,
available at LEXIS.
2. See Somini Sengupta & Julfikar Ali Manik, Secular Party Wins Landslide Victory in
Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/31/world/
asia/31bangladesh.html.
3. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the “good governance” coups in both Pakistan
and Thailand and comparing each to the Bangladeshi experience).
4. See General Pervez Musharraf, Address to Pakistan (Oct. 17, 1999). An English
translation is available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_
12oct99/musharraf_address_17oct1999.html. See also Tim Weiner & Steve LeVine,
Pakistan’s Ruler Pledges to Curb Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/17/world/pakistan-s-ruler-pledges-to-curbcorruption.html.
5. See Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand’s
Postpolitical Constitution, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 83, 97–98 (2009); John Aglionby, Thai
Military Revives Thaksin Corruption Inquiry, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 25, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/25/thailand.
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eliminated before civilian democratic rule could successfully
take root and flourish. 6 They revitalized anticorruption
commissions and attempted to remake the civilian political
landscape by using corruption charges to imprison, exile, or
marginalize political leaders, frequently with the complicity of
the judiciary and international community. Simultaneously, the
military-backed governments passed laws and created other
institutions that promoted “good governance” to lay the
groundwork for more controlled and tempered political parties
and politicians once civilian democratic rule returned.7
Curiously, little academic attention has focused on how
charges of corruption have been used as a tool by the military to
seize political power. For example, anticorruption commissions
have been praised by some for producing “significant, sustained
reductions of corruption”8 but criticized by others as “likely to
fail” while undermining the “credibility of [politicians’]
commitment to reform.” 9 Meanwhile, the repeated use of
charges of corruption to target democratically elected leaders
during military-backed takeovers has largely escaped scrutiny.10
Anticorruption campaigns form a central plank of the
“good governance” efforts of international organizations’
development agendas.11 Like most “good governance” or “rule
6. See Clark Neher, Democratization in Thailand, 21 ASIAN AFF.: AM. REV. 195, 195
(1995).
7. See infra notes 163–64, 173–80 and accompanying text (describing the militarybacked government’s efforts in Pakistan to establish a democracy free from
corruption); infra notes 202–11 and accompanying text (discussing the military-backed
government’s attempts in Thailand to revitalize democracy and remove corruption
from civilian political institutions).
8 . Michael Johnston, A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies, in THE SELFRESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 217 (Andreas
Schedler et al. eds., 1999).
9. JOHN R. HEILBRUNN, WORLD BANK INST., ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS:
PANACEA OR REAL MEDICINE TO FIGHT CORRUPTION? 1 (2004), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf.
10. See, e.g., USAID, ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES (ACAS): OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY
AND GOVERNANCE ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAM BRIEF 6 (2006) (stating that “[w]hile
[anticorruption agencies] are not likely established with this as their stated purpose,
once created, they are often manipulated by the ruling party to attack and eliminate
members of the opposition or to punish members of their own party who are perceived
as having stepped out of line,” but not commenting on the potential abuse by the
military of anticorruption agencies).
11. See, e.g., Democracy & Governance, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/
democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/anti-corruption/ (last visited Jan. 11,
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of law” efforts, these campaigns are often portrayed as politically
neutral. However, in practice, they are not. 12 Both national
anticorruption advocates and the international community are
severely constrained in pointing out corruption within the
military or the military’s own potential political biases when it
prosecutes civilian corruption. The military’s revered status as
the protector of the country and the highest emblem of its
sovereignty makes it difficult to either bring these charges or
remind the public of the military’s past malfeasance. The result
is a one-sided picture of corrupt and incompetent politicians
versus a disciplined and incorruptible military. In turn, militarybacked governments exploit this asymmetry.
This is the anticorruption paradox: while widespread,
unchecked corruption undermines the legitimacy of democratic
institutions, anticorruption campaigns may also inadvertently
threaten democratic institutions in countries with politically
active militaries by weakening civilian leaders while leaving the
military largely unscathed.13 As such, anticorruption efforts can
help lay the groundwork for a “good governance” coup. Part I
of this Article describes how anticorruption and “good
governance” campaigns helped justify and perpetuate recent
military rule in Bangladesh. After declaring a state of emergency
in 2007 (the “Emergency”) and restoring calm, the militarybacked government did not immediately move to hold elections.
Instead, it proceeded, with the complicity of the international
community, to place most of the country’s leading politicians in
jail on corruption charges in a sweeping, and seemingly

2012) (“Corruption poses a serious development challenge. In the political realm, it
can seriously undermine democracy and good governance. . . . Corruption also
undermines economic development.”); Governance & Anti-Corruption, WORLD BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/
0,,menuPK:1740542~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1740530,00.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (“The World Bank views good governance and anticorruption as important to its poverty alleviation mission.”).
12. See David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 455, 456, 465 (1999) (stating that his opposition to the global anticorruption
campaign, Kennedy argues that the international community uses the campaign to gain
legitimacy for its interventions in the developing world because it is seen as nonpolitical
and noncontroversial. Yet, he claims these interventions have both very contestable
political and economic presumptions and consequences).
13. For the purposes of this Article, “politically active militaries” refers to those
militaries that have a history of directly or indirectly ruling a country.
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planned, remake of the Bangladeshi political order. 14 The
military justified these drastic steps by claiming that the country
had to rid itself of corruption before a return to democracy was
possible.
Part II turns to the response of the Bangladeshi courts to
this far-reaching anticorruption drive. Despite protests from the
military-backed government, the High Court Division of the
Bangladesh Supreme Court ordered the release of many of the
accused politicians on bail.15 Although the most far-reaching of
these judgments were eventually overturned by the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court, 16 the High Court’s orders
provided perhaps the first and most visible act of defiance to the
military-backed Emergency, speeding the return to civilian rule.
This Article claims that in “good governance” coups, the
military frequently seeks out validation, or at least acquiescence,
by the judiciary, in part because corruption charges against
civilian leaders require the judiciary’s cooperation to be an
effective political instrument. As a result, even as anticorruption
efforts may strengthen the military against political actors, the
judiciary can use the “good governance” paradigm to become a
more powerful counterweight to the military than might
otherwise be expected.
Part III describes Bangladesh’s return to democracy and
the ultimate failure of the military’s anticorruption drive. The
Bangladesh example shows how the inevitable political
maneuvering of the military during an emergency can permeate
anticorruption efforts, thereby undercutting not only the

14. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 62-930PDF, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2008, at 2184 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2008/sca/119132.htm (nonpaginated version) [hereinafter 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT]; infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (detailing the support of Western
nations for the military-backed government's attack on the corruption of the political
parties and bureaucracy and suggesting that the West was instrumental in the coup);
infra notes 79–84 (describing the support of international institutions, such as the
World Bank and Human Rights Watch, for the military-backed government's
anticorruption efforts).
15. See infra notes 106–08, 115–18 and accompanying text (discussing the instances
in which the High Court Division granted bail to many accused of corruption).
16. See infra notes 106–12, 115–19 and accompanying text (explaining the High
Court Division's attempts at taking an aggressive stance against executive power under
the 2007 state of emergency and the Appellate Division's reversal of such judgments).
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legitimacy of these efforts, but the institutions that undertake
them.17
Part IV briefly examines similar recent “good governance”
coups in Pakistan and Thailand. Anticorruption campaigns in
these countries also helped justify military intervention, while
the courts similarly played a central role in either perpetuating
and legitimating military rule (such as in Thailand and initially
in Pakistan) or undercutting it (as in the later stages of
Musharraf’s rule in Pakistan).
Finally, Part V uses the lessons learned from these
experiences to call for a more pragmatic strategy to fight
corruption in which those promoting anticorruption efforts are
more openly skeptical of the military’s claims of being an
anticorruption savior. It argues that these anticorruption
advocates should adopt a more politically savvy strategy that
better takes into account local context. Such a strategy would
include reforms focused on institutions, processes, democratic
elections, and consistent prosecution of low-level actors. An
anticorruption model along these lines would be less likely to
inadvertently empower the military and undermine democracy.
I. CORRUPTION AND EMERGENCY IN BANGLADESH
A. History of Emergencies, Corruption, and Anticorruption Efforts in
Bangladesh
Charges of corruption and poor governance have in many
ways been the currency of regime change in Bangladesh. After
gaining independence in 1971, the country held its first
democratic elections in 1973. 18 The fledgling democratic
government led by the charismatic leader Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman faced serious internal challenges from military and
17. This is arguably a variation of the emergency powers paradox pointed out by
legal scholar Victor Ramraj, where these powers are “seen as necessary to establish the
conditions of relative stability needed for legal, political and economic reforms to take
hold, and yet a propensity to invoke these powers . . . casts doubt on a government’s
commitment to constitutionalism in the first place.” Victor V. Ramraj, The Emergency
Powers Paradox, in EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 29
(Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010).
18. T ALUKDER MANIRUZZAMAN, T HE BANGLADESH R EVOLUTION AND ITS
A FTERMATH 149 (2003).
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political factions.19 At least partly in response to the alarming
deterioration in the law and order situation, Sheikh Mujib
declared the first state of emergency in independent Bangladesh
in 1974. 20 In August 1975, members of the armed forces
assassinated Sheikh Mujib, his family members, and key
supporters, citing corruption and misrule to justify their
takeover.21
In the wake of Sheikh Mujib’s death, the country lurched
through a series of coups and countercoups22 that lasted until
Major General Ziaur Rahman, the former Chief Martial Law
Administrator, took over as President of Bangladesh in 1977.23
While General Ziaur Rahman made some progress towards
restoring civilian democracy, he too was assassinated by
renegade members of the armed forces in 1981.24 Martial law
was imposed once more after General H.M. Ershad came to
power, overthrowing an elected, civilian-led government in a
bloodless coup in 1982.25 General Ershad, like his predecessors,
pointed to corruption under the previous regime as a
justification for seizing power.26
In the late 1980s, the two major political parties, the Awami
League (“AL”) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”),
spearheaded a mass movement for democratic government.
Among other claims, they specifically used allegations of gross
corruption by General Ershad and his government to rally the
country.27 After General Ershad was deposed and the first round
of democratic elections was held in 1991, Ershad became the

19. Id.
20. LAWRENCE ZIRING , BANGLADESH: FROM MUJIB TO ERSHAD ; AN
INTERPRETIVE STUDY 101 (1993).
21. MANIRUZZAMAN, supra note 18, at 175.
22. Id. at 177–80, 191–93 (describing the series of coups and conspiracies from
various factions as General Ziaur Rahman began to consolidate power).
23. Id. at 204–05.
24. ZIRING , supra note 20, at 141.
25. Id. at 153.
26. See id., at 154 (“Ershad . . . stressed the need to install honest government, and
a purge of former ministers and bureaucrats produced a number of trials in which the
accused were charged and found guilty of using their offices for private gain.”).
27. Id. at 165 (“The principal criticism directed at President Ershad centred on
the issue of corruption.”).
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first major political figure in Bangladeshi history to be convicted
and serve jail time for corrupt dealings.28
Countervailing allegations of corruption by political party
leaders at national and local levels became commonplace in the
democratic environment after 1991. Such accusations by both
parties rose to a crescendo each time elections drew nearer in
1996, 2001, and finally 2007. Transparency International ranked
Bangladesh as either the most corrupt or tied for the most
corrupt country in the world from 2001 to 2005, and the
European Union and United States have consistently demanded
the country do more to combat corruption.29
In light of both domestic and international pressure, the
BNP-ruled
government
created
the
Anti-Corruption
Commission (“ACC”) in 2004 to replace the Bureau of AntiCorruption, which was founded in 1957 under the government
of Pakistan and had helped sustain several rounds of
dictatorship. 30 Yet, from its beginning the new ACC seemed
28. See Govt Can Now Confiscate Janata Tower Property, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Nov. 13,
2008, at 1.
29. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 17 (2005), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/annual_
report_2005 (follow the hyperlink for the language of your choice under “download in
PDF”); TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 9 (2004), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/annual_
report_2004 (follow the “English” hyperlink under “download in PDF”);
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 21 (2003), available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/
annual_report_2003 (follow the hyperlink for the language of your choice under
“download in PDF”); TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 16 (2002),
available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/
annual_report_2002 (follow the hyperlink for the language of your choice under
“download in PDF”); TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 13 (2001),
available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/
annual_report_2001 (follow the “English” hyperlink under “download in PDF”);
Interview with Iftekhar Zaman, Exec. Dir., Transparency Int’l (Mar. 18, 2009) (on file
with authors).
30. See Editorial, Anti-Graft Commission at Last, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Nov. 23, 2004,
http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/11/23/d41123020127.htm; Free Anti-Graft Body Bill
Passed After Change, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 18, 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.lcgbangladesh.org/corruption/newslinks/The%20Daily%20Star%20Web%
20Edition%20Vol_%204%20Num%20259.htm; Moin Ghani, A Toothless Tiger in the
Making?, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 21, 2003, http://www.thedailystar.net/law/
200309/03/update.htm; Muhammad Nurul Huda, Editorial, The Inaction at ACC and
the Needful, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 28, 2006, http://thedailystar.net/2006/
02/28/d60228020323.htm (stating that the Bureau of Anti-Corruption (“BAC”)
functioned under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office and “virtually did the
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doomed to be as ineffective at fighting corruption as its
predecessor.31 Although the ACC’s commissioners were selected
through a supposedly nonpartisan panel, the three
commissioners chosen to head the ACC were known as BNP
loyalists. 32 Further, the ACC’s rules of procedure and
organization were required to be approved by the executive,
which engaged in frequent showdowns with the ACC. 33 By
August 2005, thousands of cases were stalled as the ACC faced
virtual paralysis. 34 Former Law Minister Abdul Matin Khasru
latter’s bidding and served as a mere showpiece of an anticorruption body”); Interview
with Fida Kamal, Att’y Gen., Bangl. (Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with authors).
31. A former Director General of the BAC, M.A. Matin, declared later that: “It was
impossible for us to work beyond influence since we were dependent on the
government.” Matin also identified blatant political interference, sham investigations
by the executive branch, and dilatory stay orders from the High Court as several key
problems with the BAC. Govt Interference Led to BAC Failure, DAILY STAR (Bangl.),
Nov. 29, 2004, at 1.
32. See Zayadul Ahsan, How Free Would New Graft Body Be?, DAILY STAR (Bangl.),
Nov. 23, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/11/23/
d4112301044.htm (stating that some Anti-Corruption Commission (“ACC”) members
either enjoyed direct ties with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) leadership or
had been previously appointed to various important posts under the BNP
government).
33. The key weaknesses of the ACC statute of 2004 lay in Articles 34 and 36. The
statute empowered the ACC to formulate rules of internal organization and procedure.
As a statutory public authority, it was expected to elaborate and formulate rules of
procedure and organization under the original mandate of the statute in order to
ensure functionality and efficiency of the organization. Unlike other “independent”
public institutions, however, the ACC was required to seek final approval of these rules
from the executive branch. Indeed, the executive branch canceled the commissioners’
choices for general secretary and director of the ACC. See Zayadul Ahsan & Julfikar Ali
Manik, Govt, ACC at Loggerheads, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 4, 2005, at 1; see also AntiCorruption Commission Act of 2004, arts. 34, 36 (Bangl.) [hereinafter ACC Act].
Article 34 states: “Power to Formulate Rules—In order to fulfil [sic] the aims and
objectives of this law, the commission may, subject to the prior approval of the
President and through a notification in the official gazette, frame rules and
regulations.” ACC Act, supra, art. 34. Article 36 provides:
Power of the Government to Resolve Difficulties—If a situation arises where it
is difficult to apply and execute this law because of vagueness about the
powers and responsibilities of the commission under it, the government will
explain and clarify the matter and give the commission directives and
guidelines about what is to be done through an official gazette notification
and in accordance with other rules and regulations.).
ACC Act, supra, art. 36. An English translation is available at http://unpan1.un.org/
intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN019089.pdf.
34. See Abdullah A. Dewan, Corruption, Media and Performance Based Budgeting,
DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/09/15/
d509151501108.htm.
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alleged that the poor design was in fact intentional, stating:
“The government has tied the hands of the commission by
forming contradictory and faulty laws to keep it under
control.”35
B. Prelude to Emergency: Failure of the Caretaker Regime Process
It was not just the newly created ACC that failed to make a
clean break from the destructive politicization and
ineffectiveness that marred its predecessor’s past. Bangladesh’s
unique caretaker system, designed to impartially govern the
country during elections, became ensconced in the very
intraparty fights it was created to avoid, eventually leading to a
military takeover in 2007.
Bangladesh’s caretaker system is essentially a symbol of the
distrust between the two major political parties. After the
transition from military-backed rule in 1991, allegations of
corruption and vote-rigging overshadowed the electoral process
in Bangladesh.36 As a result, during the initial tenure of the
newly elected BNP-led government, the primary opposition
party, the AL, began to agitate for a new election system.37 In
March 1996, after months of crippling impasse, brutal political
violence, and a botched election, the BNP government agreed
to amend the Constitution to create a caretaker system.38 Under
this system, the party in power relinquishes government
administration to a group of advisers led by the most recently
retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.39 It is essentially a
shadow administration of presumably neutral prominent citizens
and qualified technocrats from various fields chosen in
consultation with the major political parties. This government’s
purpose is to impartially govern the country for up to ninety

35. ACC Lacks Transparency Completely, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 18, 2006, at 1.
36. See MD. ABDUL HALIM, CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS:
BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE 394–95 (1998).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 395–96 (describing the buildup to the creation of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Bangladeshi Constitution, which established the caretaker system).
39. See id. at 397.
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days after the dissolution of Parliament and assist the Election
Commission in holding a free, fair, and credible election.40
Two elections in which the two major political parties
alternated power were successfully held under this innovative
system, with the AL winning in 1996 and the BNP returning to
power in 2001.41 The system, however, came under serious attack
in the months leading up to the scheduled election of 2007. The
AL accused the BNP of manipulating the rules regarding the
age of retirement in order to appoint a partisan Justice as the
Chief Adviser to the caretaker government.42 As a result of this
disagreement, the country was plunged into violence
orchestrated by the major political parties.43 Approximately sixtythree people, mostly political party activists and local leaders,
were killed in street fights and targeted assassinations in just
twenty days. 44 Nonetheless, the BNP-appointed president of
Bangladesh, Iajuddin Ahmed, took over the position of Chief
Adviser and formed a caretaker government on October 29,
2006.45
The AL expressed its immediate suspicion of the
president’s motives and the situation progressively worsened as
the constitutionally mandated ninety-day deadline to hold
elections in January drew nearer.46 On January 3, 2007, the AL
withdrew from the scheduled election, citing lack of confidence
in the impartiality of the caretaker regime and a flawed voter
list, and threatening violence against any individual who
participated in the election. 47 Observers worried that the
country was headed towards civil war.48
40. See id. at 399; A.K.M. Masudul Haque, Emergency Powers and Caretaker
Government in Bangladesh, 1 J. AUSTRALASIAN L. TCHRS. ASS’N 81, 84 (2008).
41. See Haque, supra note 40, at 85.
42. Sabir Mustafa, Bangladesh: An Emergency Foretold, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6253889.stm.
43. Id.
44. See generally Press Release, Nasiruddin Elan, Odhikar, 63 Persons Killed Due to
Political Violence in Last 20 Days, from Oct 27 to Nov 15, 2006 (Nov. 16, 2006),
available at http://www.odhikar.org/pr/pdf/pr_political_killing_nov_16_2006.pdf.
45. See Shakhawat Liton, President Sworn in as Chief of Caretaker Govt, DAILY STAR
(Bangl.), Oct. 30, 2006, at 1.
46. See Mustafa, supra note 42.
47. See Grand Alliance to Form Vote Resistance Committees, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 9,
2007, at 1, available at http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/01/09/d7010901107.htm.
48. See Hasina Declares Tougher Actions, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 11, 2007, at 1.
Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the Awami League (“AL”), alleged that the caretaker
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On January 11, as both parties geared up for what seemed
likely to be a bloody, nationwide showdown on the scheduled
election day, a military-backed midnight coup forced President
Iajuddin Ahmed to declare the Emergency and resign from the
Office of Chief Adviser. 49 The next day, with the military’s
support, former World Bank economist Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed
assumed the position as the new chief adviser to the caretaker
government.50
C. The Declaration of Emergency and the Anticorruption Agenda
The scourge of corruption was presented as a key
motivation of the new government from its very inception and
the military argued it was uniquely situated to rise above and
combat this scourge. Although under the Constitution a
caretaker government is only charged with routine government
functions and the execution of a fair election, Dr. Fakhruddin
Ahmed interpreted his mandate as a license to eradicate
corruption and criminality from politics, which he saw as the
root cause of the derailment of democracy in Bangladesh.51 He
identified corruption as a key impediment to democracy in his
first speech to the nation and vowed to reconstitute a truly
independent and activist ACC.52
government was in fact being controlled by the BNP and said that “none should get
involved in the one-sided election just to become enemy of the people.” The BNP, on
the other hand, insisted that the elections must be held on January 22 to fulfill the
ninety-day deadline stipulated by the Constitution. Id.
49. See Shakhawat Liton, Fakhruddin New CA, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 13, 2007,
at 1.
50. See Jalal Alamgir, Bangladesh’s Fresh Start, 20 J. DEMOCRACY 41, 49 (2009)
(stating that although it was difficult to determine the regime’s exact dynamics,
“[g]enerally, it appeared that the hard-line [National Coordination Committee on
Corruption and Serious Crime (“NCC”)] and [Directorate General of Forces
Intelligence (“DGFI”)] were in charge of political decisions; the ACC was in charge of
legally prosecuting those identified by the NCC and DGFI; the civilian authority ran the
technocratic aspects of governance, including economic policy; and legislation was
prepared by those groups and given to President Ahmed to sign in the form of
executive ordinances”); Liton, supra note 45.
51. See CA Vows to Transfer Power Through Polls at Earliest, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan.
22, 2007, at 1. Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed's agenda also included reconstituting the
Election Commission, implementing a voter identification card scheme, eradicating
the influence of black money and criminals in elections, encouraging honest
candidates to run for political office, and promoting the independence of the judiciary.
See id.
52. See id.
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The military also made its support for an anticorruption
drive firmly known. In a major speech during the Emergency
period, Army Chief Moeen U. Ahmed envisioned a political
system with new players instead of the corrupt leadership of the
past. The Army Chief viewed the anticorruption agenda as key
to achieving the regime’s goals, stating that:
The roadmap to democracy lies, I presume, with objectives
as envisioned by the government through anti-corruption
drive and reform packages, within [an] affordable time
frame that will steer the country away from escapism and
build [a] strong foundation of validity on democracy . . . .
We do not want to go back to an “elective democracy”
where corruption in society becomes all pervasive,
governance suffers in terms of insecurity and violation of
rights, and where political “criminalisation” threatens the
very survival and integrity of the state.53

This thinly veiled threat against civilian politicians foreshadowed
the military-backed government’s “minus-two” strategy,54 which
aimed to send the leaders of the two major political parties—
Sheikh Hasina of the AL and Khaleda Zia of the BNP—into
exile, replacing them with new pliant leadership.55
Civil society generally applauded the takeover and the
choice of Fakhruddin Ahmed as the chief adviser, and there was
initial widespread popular support of the anticorruption drive
initiated by the military-backed government.56 The editor of the
most popular vernacular newspaper, Prothom Alo, expressed a
degree of relief with regards to the coup, stating that: “While the
country was advancing towards a civil war like situation following
confrontations and bloodshed due to the two political alliances
locking horns, the armed forces successfully took some steps to
rein in the situation.”57
53. Bangladesh to Have Own Brand of Democracy, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Apr. 3, 2007,
at 1 (quoting Army Chief Moeen U. Ahmed in one of his speeches to the nation).
54. Bangladesh: The Minus-Two Solution, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2007, at 66 .
55. INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REPORT NO. 151, RESTORING DEMOCRACY IN
BANGLADESH 20 (2008), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/
Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/151_restoring_democracy_in_bangladesh.pdf
[hereinafter ICG].
56. See 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2177.
57. Top Ex-Army Men for Purge of Political Parties, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 21,
2007, at 1.

750 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:737
The regime also received the support of Western diplomats,
which some claimed were instrumental in the coup,58 and the
military-backed government leaders remained in sustained
consultation with them throughout its tenure. 59 Western
diplomats reportedly saw the military as “a last resort and
necessary evil” to take on the corruption of the political parties
and bureaucracy.60 As a result, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and other Western countries and development agencies
largely condoned the takeover.61
In Bangladesh, like many developing countries, there is a
history of perceived “good coups” in which the military moves in
to stabilize a political order that is seen to have been
mismanaged by the political parties. The 2007 coup, at least
initially, fit into this broader narrative.

58. See ICG, supra note 55, at 7.
59. See, e.g., Alamgir, supra note 50, at 48 (highlighting that “negotiations over the
military’s role were conducted with Western diplomats, not with representatives from
either political party”); Army Pressed for Nat’l Unity Govt, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 18,
2011, at 1 (detailing discussions between the military-backed government and the
United States in which Bangladeshi military officers expressed to US diplomats their
preference for the next consensus leader for a national unity government); Diplomats
Hope Election Will Be Held Soon, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 23, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/01/23/d7012301096.htm (discussing how envoys
from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States met with the
Bangladeshi foreign affairs adviser to discuss the regime's plans); Caretaker Govt Steps
into Second Year Today, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 12, 2008, http://www.thedailystar.net/
newDesign/print_news.php?nid=18898 (describing how Bangladesh’s “development
partners,” including the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
were “keeping close watch on the evolving situation ahead of the general elections”);
Foreign Adviser Updates Envoys on Govt Action, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 16, 2008,
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/print_news.php?nid=19439 (noting how the
Bangladesh foreign affairs adviser briefed foreign officials on “the government’s
actions over the past year and outlined challenges the government may face” in 2008).
60. ICG, supra note 55, at 9. A senior diplomat commented that some colleagues
saw the army’s intervention as “the only way to protect our development investments.
We were getting robbed by both the Awami League and BNP-Jamaat governments.” Id.
61. See id. at 7.
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D. The Drive Against Corruption
1. Nature of the Emergency Regime
After taking power, the military-backed government quickly
passed the Emergency Powers Ordinance (“EPO”) 62 and
Emergency Power Rules (“EPR”).63 These promulgations laid
out the ground rules of the regime and gave it the tools to
pursue a zealous anticorruption agenda aimed at removing the
extant political class from the helm of the state. Fundamental
rights were immediately suspended under the EPR including the
freedoms of speech, movement, assembly, and association.64 The
EPR allowed for arrests without warrants, the use of force to
execute government orders, and the detainment of any person
indefinitely without charges, no right to bail, and specific
provisions on the prosecution of corruption. 65 Subsequent
amendments to the EPR also allowed the government or the
ACC to withdraw any case for trial under a Special Judges’ Court
with territorial jurisdiction over all of Bangladesh and the power
to try any violations of the EPR.66
These sweeping rules gave the army and the caretaker
regime unprecedented authority to detain and try citizens on
potentially unverified charges.67 The trials, often prosecuted by
the ACC, took place in closed courtrooms, labeled as
“kangaroo” courts by opponents,68 beyond the purview of the

62. Emergency Powers Ordinance (Ordinance No. 1/2007) (Bangl.) [hereinafter
EPO]. An English translation of this law is available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/
RULAC/pdf_state/Emergency-Power-Ordinance-2007.pdf.
63. Emergency Powers Rules (S.R.O. No. 15-Ain/2007) (Bangl.) [hereinafter
EPR]. An English translation of this law is available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/
RULAC/pdf_state/Emergency-power-rules-2007.pdf. See Rules Promulgated to Curb
Political Activity, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 27, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/01/27/d7012701011.htm.
64. EPR, supra note 63, r. 3, 5–6; see Haque, supra note 40, at 88.
65. EPR, supra note 63, r. 10, 15–16, 19(d); see Haque, supra note 40, at 89.
66. See Haque, supra note 40, at 89. The Special Courts were required to complete
trials and sentencing within forty-five days of the trial’s commencement (and there was
a possible extension of thirty additional days in cases of unforeseeable events). See id. at
90.
67. See id.
68. See Interview with Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir, Ph.D., prominent politician,
Awami League (Mar. 19, 2009) (on file with authors).
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press or the general public.69 One scholar concluded: “The EPR
and the EPO, by suspending the safeguards from arrest and
detention, effectively legalise arbitrary arrests and detention.
The [implication] . . . [is] that everyone is subject to the risk of
endless detention without any legal avenues of redress.”70
2. The Anticorruption Agenda: Tool for Change
The government’s ambitious anticorruption campaign was
used as a tool to reconfigure the political landscape of
Bangladesh. This agenda was publicized and executed from the
regime’s very inception in a manner that suggested a significant
degree of preplanning and coordination.
Immediately after the declaration of emergency in early
2007, the military-backed regime began its crackdown on many
top politicians, some of whom were commonly viewed as corrupt
and who may have been connected with criminal networks
through which they facilitated violence and extortion. 71 By
January 19, merely a week into the new regime, nearly 2000
people, mostly low-level party activists, were in police custody,
while arrest warrants were issued for approximately another
1000.72 Political activists at the district level were directed to go
into hiding by the central leadership of the major political
parties.73
On February 1, 2007, the ACC initiated an investigation
against two major political players—the former communications
minister and the business partner of Tarique Rahman (the son
of BNP chairwoman and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia).74
On February 22, 2007, retired Army Chief Hasan Mashhud
Chowdhury was installed as the chairman of the reconstituted
ACC, 75 a move that could be interpreted as a signal of the
69. See Haque, supra note 40, at 90. The risk of endless detention was seemingly
contrary to Article 31(3) of the Constitution that guarantees open and public trials. See
id. at 89–90.
70. See id. at 90.
71. See Midnight Crackdown on “Corrupt” Politicians, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 5,
2007, at 1.
72. See JCD Leaders Rounded up in Raids, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 19, 2007, at 1.
73. See Rakib Hasnet Suman, BNP Men Told to Avert Arrest, DAILY STAR (Bangl.),
Jan. 20, 2007, at 1.
74. See Mamun Arrested, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 2, 2007, at 1.
75. Lt Gen (rtd) Mashhud Made ACC Chief, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 23, 2007, at 1.
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military’s control over the anticorruption agenda. The caretaker
government and army increasingly began to target prominent
politicians and created lists of hundreds of high profile
politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen to be arrested on
corruption and other criminal charges in the coming weeks.76
The first high profile detainees were sent to jail on charges of
antistate activities, sabotage, and corruption under the EPO.77
Within the Emergency’s first few months, estimates of those
netted in the anticorruption drive ranged from 100,000 to
200,000, although there is little reliable data and many were
released shortly after being arrested.78
Amidst this anticorruption blitzkrieg, on February 5, the
government announced that it would sign the UN Convention
Against Corruption,79 providing additional legitimacy for its farreaching anticorruption activities, which were already broadly
supported domestically, and condoned by the international
community. 80 According to the 2009 Human Rights Watch
Report on Bangladesh: “Several international donor agencies
such as the Asia[n] Development Bank, United Nations
Development Programme, and World Bank are providing
support to the government’s anti-corruption efforts. They have
rarely raised publicly any concerns about abuses resulting from
the campaign.”81 For example, a US$150 million loan from the
Asian Development Bank supported the rapid expansion of the
ACC during the military’s rule. 82 Human Rights Watch also
reported that the international community was generally
76. See Midnight Crackdown on “Corrupt” Politicians, supra note 71, at 1.
77. See Caught Political Bigwigs Detained, Sent to Jail, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 6,
2007, at 1 (noting that these high profile detainees were imprisoned and charged
under Section 16(2) of the 2007 Emergency Powers Ordinance).
78. See ICG, supra note 55, at 17; Wadood Bhuiyan’s Brother Among 1,449 Held, DAILY
STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 16, 2007, at 1. On March 7, Tarique Rahman, the son of the former
Prime Minister and leader of the BNP, Khaleda Zia, was detained by the joint forces on
a midnight raid and charged with extortion the next day. See Tarique Remanded in
Extortion Case, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Mar. 9, 2007, at 1.
79. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S.
41.
80. See id.; Dhaka to Sign Anti-Graft UN Convention, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 6,
2007, at 1.
81. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009, at 221 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/bangladesh.
82. Good Governance Program: Bangladesh, ASIAN DEV. BANK, http://pid.adb.org/
pid/LoanView.htm?projNo=37017&seqNo=01&typeCd=3 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
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supportive of the military-backed regime, as “no international
actors publicly called on the army to return full powers to a
civilian government.”83 Transparency International also worked
closely with the military-backed government as an advisor on its
anticorruption efforts, hoping to make the most of what it saw as
a potential opportunity to strengthen anticorruption institutions
during the Emergency.84
Among those arrested by the military-backed government
were local government officials brought in on dubious
corruption charges.85 These officials were then replaced with
individuals reportedly loyal to the military. 86 Prominent
journalists and activists also were frequently arrested or
intimidated with the prospect of arrest.87 The military seemed to
use corruption charges to both solidify its power and stifle
dissent as it attempted to remake the Bangladeshi political
order.
Central to that reformulation agenda was its “minus-two”
strategy to send into exile former Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina
and Khaleda Zia, the respective leaders of the AL and BNP. This
plan failed, however, as the army underestimated their political
support and encountered international resistance.88 In response,
the regime arrested Sheikh Hasina on July 16, 2007, on charges
of extorting 30,000,000 taka (about US$500,000) 89 and on
September 3, it arrested Khaleda Zia on various charges of
graft.90 As one official reportedly commented: “[W]e gave them
the easy way out, but they did not want to go. So we decided to
83. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2008, at 245 (2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2k8_web.pdf.
84. See ICG, supra note 55, at 8; Interview with Iftekhar Zaman, Exec. Dir.,
Transparency Int’l (Mar. 18, 2009) (on file with authors).
85. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 42-228PDF, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHT
PRACTICES FOR 2007, at 2161 (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2007/100612.htm (nonpaginated copy) [hereinafter 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].
86. See ICG, supra note 55, at 16.
87. See id. at 19.
87. See Ex-Premier Hasina Returns Home, ASIANEWS.IT, May 8, 2007,
http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Ex-premier-Hasina-returns-home-9200.html; Khaleda’s
Exile Move Runs Out of Steam, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Apr. 25, 2007, at 1; Sheikh Hasina
Warrant Suspended, BBC NEWS, Apr. 23, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/
6583729.stm.
89. See Hasina Arrested, Sent to Sub-Jail, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), July 17, 2007, at 1.
90. See 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 85, at 2168; ICG, supra note 55, at
21.
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make their lives so difficult in the courts that they wish they had
gone [into exile].”91 By the time Khaleda Zia was arrested in
September 2007, a large number of the most powerful leaders
from the two major political parties had been arrested as well,
generally on allegations of corruption, although many were held
for months without formal charges.92
Given the levels of corruption in Bangladesh, the US State
Department described many of the ACC’s charges as “credible.”
Still, as the military’s drive against corruption continued,
increasing numbers of Bangladeshis and outside observers
began to view the detention of these political and business
leaders as politically motivated. Fueling this suspicion was the
fact that several high-profile politicians, who were widely
perceived as corrupt, but who had supported the caretaker
government and the military’s intervention, were not
prosecuted.93
II. BLOCKED IN COURT
Given that most of Bangladesh’s prominent political leaders
were detained on corruption charges, the battle between the
military and politicians came to court. There, the High Court
Division of the Supreme Court dealt some of the first and most
visible blows against the legitimacy of the military’s “good
governance” coup. This confrontation between the High Court
Division and the military hastened the end of the military’s rule.
It is also an example of how activist militaries attempt to draw
legitimacy from the judicial branch and thus can become
particularly susceptible to judicial opposition in “good
governance” coups.
As of 2008, the Supreme Court in Bangladesh consisted of a
sixty-seven judge High Court Division and an Appellate Division

91. ICG, supra note 55, at 21.
92. See 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 85, at 2160, 2168.
93. See 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2183. The US State
Department reported that human rights organizations have estimated that by the end
of 2007, the Bangladeshi government had detained some 200 high-ranking politicians,
businessmen, and officials as part of its anticorruption campaign. See 2007 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 85, at 2161.
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of seven judges. 94 Judges are traditionally appointed by the
president to the Appellate Division from the High Court
Division in their order of seniority, but this practice has been
ignored on a number of occasions for allegedly political
reasons.95
Prominent senior counsel are far more influential in
Bangladesh and across South Asia than they often are elsewhere
in the world. The fact that a high profile senior lawyer argues a
case is typically thought to sway its outcome, and as a result such
senior counsel are paid disproportionately more than other
lawyers.96 The ACC hired many of these best-known lawyers of
the Bangladeshi bar on retainer.97 Some critics claimed the ACC
did this simply so they would not be available to defend
politicians. 98 Others said lawyers were threatened into not
representing those facing corruption charges.99
Nevertheless, the High Court Division of the Supreme
Court provided a constant source of aggravation to the military
government during the Emergency, consistently offering
limiting interpretations of the government’s emergency powers.
On February 26, 2007, the High Court declared illegal the
detention order against a former AL member of Parliament and
three others.100 It observed that the powers of the High Court
Division, which allowed it to issue directions, could not be
curtailed by the EPR. 101 This outspoken decision was
prominently covered in the media and was among the earliest
and most visible challenges to the government’s claim to broad
emergency powers to remake Bangladeshi democratic
94. There is only one chief justice of the Supreme Court and he has the power to
assign benches in both divisions, as well as significant power in both the appointment
and promotion of judges. Since 2008, additional judges have been sworn in. As of
October 2011, there are ninety-eight high court judges in Bangladesh. See Ten HC
Judges Sworn In, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Oct. 21, 2011, at 1.
95. See Bangladesh: Culture of Supersession in Supreme Court Will Undermine Rule of
Law, ASIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (May 26, 2008), http://www.humanrights.asia/
news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-147-2008.
96. See Interview with Rafique-Ul Huq, Defense Attorney (Mar. 20, 2009) (on file
with authors).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Detention of Ex-MP Kamal Majumder Declared Illegal, DAILY STAR (Bangl.),
Feb. 27, 2007, at 1.
101. See id.
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institutions. 102 As one well-known critic of the militarygovernment explained, it was the first time after the coup that
the military began to “lose face.”103
Throughout the Emergency, the decisions of the High
Court Division provided a rallying point for those who opposed
the military government’s attempts to use the crisis to
restructure or “cleanse” Bangladeshi politics. These decisions
carried great symbolic weight. Declaring the government’s
actions illegal significantly undercut the military’s claims that its
intervention was necessary to promote “good governance.” For
most of the Emergency, however, these judgments usually
remained merely symbolic, as the Supreme Court’s Appellate
Division stayed or overruled the High Court Division’s most
assertive decisions.
A. Showdown on Bail
The EPR barred “any court or tribunal” from granting bail
to those accused or being investigated of offenses under the EPR
or certain statutes. 104 Government counsel argued these
provisions should be upheld and bail should be denied because
the accused might intimidate witnesses, tamper with evidence,
or flee the country.105 With so many leading politicians in jail
charged with or awaiting charges of corruption, the no-bail
provision took on pivotal political significance. If these
individuals could be kept confined and preoccupied with legal
cases, the military-backed government would have a freer hand
in remaking Bangladeshi politics.
The bar on seeking bail under the EPR was immediately
challenged in the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice referred
102. See Interview with Nazmul Ahsan Kalimullah, Ph.D., Chairman, Dep’t of Pub.
Admin., Univ. of Dhaka (Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with authors).
103. Id.
104. EPR, supra note 63, r. 10–11, 19D; see Ridwanul Hoque, The Recent Emergency
and the Politics of the Judiciary in Bangladesh, 2 NUJS L. REV. 183, 194 (2009) (explaining
that “notwithstanding the general legal provision concerning bail, no application for
bail can be made to ‘any court or tribunal’ by a person against whom an inquiry,
investigation, or trial is pending concerning an offence under the [emergency power
rule] or certain [emergency power rule]-covered statutes” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Haque, supra note 40, at 89 (explaining how after its initial promulgation, the
Emergency Powers Rules were amended to expand government’s powers).
105. See Interview with Fida Kamal, supra note 30.
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the case to a high court division criminal bench consisting of
Justices Nozrul Islam Chowdhury and Emdadul Haque.106 On
April 22, 2007, the bench granted bail to Moyezuddin Sikder, a
businessman charged with colluding to create an artificial fuel
scarcity. 107 Although the government argued that the EPR
removed the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, the justices
declared that the term “any court or tribunal” in the rules was
not meant to include the Supreme Court.108
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, however,
stayed the High Court Division’s decision on May 24, 2007.109
Thus began a pattern where over the ensuing months, the High
Court Division would grant bail to politicians who had been
jailed on corruption charges, including prominent leaders like
Khaleda Zia, only to quickly have the Appellate Division stay
most of these orders.110
A year later on April 23, 2008, the Appellate Division
formally overturned the High Court Division in State v.
Moyezuddin Sikder and unanimously found that the EPR was
intended to remove the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction for these
bail matters.111 Further, it reprimanded the High Court Division
for writing “lengthy judgments” that embarked upon
“[c]onstitutional questions” in deciding bail petitions.112
This decision by the Appellate Division did not give the
executive an entirely free hand. It declared that if an order was
without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or if the allegations were
106. HC to Consider Bail Petitions, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Apr. 23, 2007, at 1.
107. See State v. Moyezuddin Sikder, (2008) 60 DLR (AD) 82 (Bangl.).
108. Hoque, supra note 104, at 194.
109. AIN O SALISH KENDRA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BANGLADESH 2008, at 16 (Sara
Hossain ed.), available at http://www.askbd.org/web/?page_id=430; HC Grants Bail to
Hasina, Stays Power Plant Graft Case, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Nov. 5, 2007, at 1; Khaleda
Granted Bail: Proceedings Stayed, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Oct. 1, 2007, at 1; SC Extends Stay
on Hasina’s Bail, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Aug. 17, 2007, at 1; SC Stays Hasina’s Bail Order,
DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Aug. 3, 2007, at 1.
110. See The Trial of Sheikh Hasina: International Community Fails to Ensure Due
Process, ACHR WKLY. REV.–ASIAN CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (Mar. 27, 2008),
http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2008/211-08.html.
111. Moyezuddin Sikder, (2008) 60 DLR (AD) 82 (Bangl.). To justify denying bail,
the Appellate Division relied on Bangladeshi Supreme Court precedent decisions from
the Privy Council during colonial India and on Pakistani Supreme Court rulings. It also
cited to Solicitor, Government of Bangladesh v. Syed Sanwar. See Moyezuddin Sikder, 60 DLR
(AD) at 86–87.
112. Id. at 89–90.
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made in bad faith, the High Court Division may grant bail, but
found that these arguments were not made in the Moyezuddin
Sikder case.113 If the Appellate Division provided a window to
challenge the EPR’s bail provisions in this decision, it did not
seem like a victory to many. A former president of the
Bangladesh Bar Association called the decision a “black
chapter” in the history of the Bangladesh judiciary.114
The Moyezuddin Sikder case was not the only time the High
Court Division and Appellate Division clashed over the
Emergency Powers Rules. Most of the cases the ACC brought
during the Emergency were based on alleged acts of corruption
that predated both the Emergency and the promulgation of the
EPR. Defense lawyers for Sheikh Hasina, in a case implicating
her for extortion, argued that applying the EPR’s strict
procedural constraints—including the bail provisions—to try
alleged pre-Emergency crimes was tantamount to ex post facto
legislation.115
In February 2008, the High Court Division agreed. Justices
Shah Abu Nayeem Mominur Rahman and Shahidul Islam ruled
that applying the EPR to the corruption cases against Sheikh
Hasina was retrospective and unconstitutional, meaning she
could not be barred from seeking bail.116 In pointed language,
the court went on to further hold that curbing the right to bail
violated the fundamental rights of the Constitution. 117 It
concluded that the “Emergency has not curtailed the power and
authority of . . . the [c]ourt.”118
Subsequently, the Appellate Division stymied the High
Court Division’s stand against the government once again. In
May 2008, a month after overruling the High Court in
Moyezuddin Sikder, the Appellate Division found that the EPR did
113. Id. at 89.
114. SC Strikes Down HC Jurisdiction for Granting Bail in EPR Cases, FIN. EXPRESS
(Bangl.), Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?news_id=
31650.
115. See Bangladesh v. Sheikh Hasina, (2008) 60 DLR (AD) 90, 99 (Bangl.).
116. Bangladesh v. Sheikh Hasina, (2008) 13 BLC (HCD) 121, 123 (Bangl.)
(judgment delivered on Feb. 5, 2008); see Hoque, supra note 104, at 195–98.
117. Sheikh Hasina, (2008) 13 BLC (HCD) at 144–45; see Hoque, supra note 104, at
196.
118. Sheikh Hasina, (2008) 13 BLC (HCD) at 148; see Hoque, supra note 104, at
196.
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not act as an ex post facto law nor did it violate the fundamental
rights of the Constitution.119
Being overturned was not the only setback to judges on the
High Court Division who wanted to take a more aggressive
stance against executive power under the Emergency. 120 In
March 2008, the chief justice moved Justice Rahman and Justice
Islam, who had granted bail to Sheikh Hasina and a number of
other prominent politicians, to a civil bench where they would
no longer hear bail applications.121 The court said this move was
a routine reallocation of benches, while human rights activists
argued their transfer was punishment for these justices’
outspoken assertiveness during the Emergency.122
Justices on the High Court Division voiced their frustration
with the powerlessness they felt at continuing to be overruled by
the Appellate Division.123 Justice Nozrul Islam Chowdhury, who
had granted the original request for bail for Moyezuddin Sikder,
reportedly told a lawyer requesting bail for his client in May
2008 that he should seek bail with Allah instead.124 He lamented:
“We cannot go by the oath we took under the Constitution.
[This] is a Court within brackets.”125

119. See Sheikh Hasina, (2008) 60 DLR (AD) at 90.
120. Another legal battleground was over the evasion of taxes, a charge levied
against many leading politicians. The accused were frequently asked to provide wealth
statements, which were then used to frame corruption charges. In December 2007, in a
case involving the former minister of power, the High Court Division found that the
former minister had not been given an opportunity to be heard and explain the
discrepancies before criminal charges were brought against him. See Iqbal Hasan
Mahmood v. Bangladesh, (2008) 60 DLR (HCD) 88 (Bangl.) (judgment delivered on
Dec. 5, 2007). Unsurprisingly, the Appellate Division overturned the High Court
Division’s order on March 19, 2008, allowing the trial to continue. See SC Clears Way for
Trial of Tuku, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Mar. 20, 2008, at 1 (reporting on the Appellate
Division’s decision).
121. See HC Bench of Justice Nayeem, Shahidul Stripped of Writ Powers, DAILY STAR
(Bangl.), Mar. 18, 2008, at 1; The Trial of Sheikh Hasina: International Community Fails to
Ensure Due Process, supra note 110.
122. See HC Bench of Justice Nayeem, Shahidul Stripped of Writ Powers, supra note 121;
The Trial of Sheikh Hasina: International Community Fails to Ensure Due Process, supra note
110.
123. See Bangladesh: A Weary High Court Suggests Appellant Seek Bail from Allah,
ASIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (May 28, 2008), http://www.humanrights.asia/news/
ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-149-2008.
124. See id.
125. Id.
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The far greater willingness of the High Court Division to
challenge the government than the Appellate Division is both
striking and somewhat mysterious. Some have suggested that
this difference was simply the result of different personalities of
the judges. 126 Meanwhile, law professor Ridwanul Hoque has
argued that perhaps because the High Court Division justices
knew they could be later overruled, they attempted to test the
waters and assert their judicial powers more strongly against the
executive.127 Another theory is that the executive was simply less
successful at capturing the opinion of the lower levels of the
judiciary than in the Appellate Division.128
The Bangladeshi experience of having the High Court
Division more spiritedly protect encroachments by the executive
during an emergency is not without precedent in the region. In
India, during the 1975–1977 emergency, several High Courts
found that detainees could appeal to the court for release even
if they were barred under the emergency from moving the court
to enforce the rights to life and personal liberty.129 This safety
valve was later blocked by the Supreme Court in Jabalpur v.

126. See Interview with Mahtab Haider, Shameran Abed & Shahiduzzaman, Staff
Members, New Age (Mar. 17, 2009) (on file with authors) [hereinafter New Age
Interview]; Interview with Fida Kamal, supra note 30; Interview with Rafique-Ul Huq,
supra note 96.
127. See Hoque, supra note 104, at 202. Such an interpretation is seemingly
supported by the timeline of political events. The Appellate Division stayed the High
Court Division’s decision in Moyezuddin Sikder just days before the AL general secretary
Abdul Jalil was brought into custody by the police. In July, Sheikh Hasina herself would
be arrested, and by September, Khaleda Zia was arrested as well. The Appellate Division
may have realized the tide was shifting against the leaders of the political parties and
did not want to risk its limited political capital trying to support them. See Jalil, Babar,
Sheikh Selim, Altaf, Mintoo, Others Held in Massive Drive, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 29,
2007, at 1.
128. See SURYA SREENIVASAN, JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO EMERGENCY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF INDIA AND BANGLADESH 19 (2009). Still, it is difficult to substantiate whether
the military-backed interim government influenced any of the Appellate Division
judges or, alternatively, whether the High Court Division may have been pressured by
the political parties to support their leaders. See id. at 12.
129. 2 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 1479 (4th ed. 2002) (“9
High Courts refused to countenance the monstrous doctrine that a détenu could not
secure his release from preventive detention by an application for habeas corpus even
if he was detained without the authority of law, or contrary to law, or under a mala fide
order or an order based on irrelevant considerations.”).
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Shukla,130 which effectively allowed detainees to be stripped of
habeas corpus rights.131
Two examples do not make a pattern, but the similarities of
the situations in India and Bangladesh may indicate, somewhat
counterintuitively, that apex courts could be less willing to
challenge executive emergency powers than subordinate courts.
This phenomenon needs to be better understood if courts are to
be seen as a meaningful check on militaries during states of
emergency.
B. The Tide Turns
During early and mid-2008, against the backdrop of
continued pushback by the courts, the military-backed interim
government came under increasing domestic and international
pressure to hold elections, which it ultimately scheduled for
December 2008.132 By this point, the interim government had
failed to actualize its plan to remake Bangladesh’s political
parties. Now it was faced with a situation in which the country’s
leading politicians were in jail in the run-up to the elections. It
was this change in political circumstances that ultimately led to
the release of the hundreds of politicians charged with
corruption and other offenses under the EPR.
As negotiations between the military and political parties
continued, politicians started being released from jail.133 The
ACC had rushed to prosecute so many so fast it had often not
followed all the required procedures and defendants used these
irregularities to their advantage. 134 Dozens of high profile
politicians were released on bail by the High Court Division in
130. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 (India).
131. Id.; see SREENIVASAN, supra note 128, at 12.
132. See New Age Interview, supra note 126. The military is particularly susceptible
to international pressure because they fear without a civilian government they might
lose their United Nations peacekeeping contracts, which account for a large share of
their budget. See id.; ICG, supra note 55, at 7.
133. See AIN O SALISH KENDRA, supra note 109, at 77–78.
134. See id. at 66. Officials had frequently failed to submit reports in accordance
with the filing deadlines of the ACC rules. Many trials were not completed within the
statutory time frame of ninety days, nor were investigations completed within the
mandated sixty days. In the hurry to revitalize itself, the ACC had even failed to
properly appoint many of its officers, meaning the cases they had investigated or
prosecuted now became open to challenge. See id.
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July and August of 2008.135 By the end of August, the media
reported that on a single day, bail was being granted in a
different case every sixty-three seconds. 136 Khaleda Zia was
released on September 11, 2008. 137 Sheikh Hasina, who had
been allowed to go to the United States on medical grounds in
June 2008, returned to the country on November 6, 2008, to
contest the December elections.138
It was widely believed that bail petitions were allowed to go
forward in 2008 on political grounds because the legal
irregularities that were used to justify the release of various
politicians and activists had been present for many months
without the accused being released. 139 Furthermore, at that
point the government did not even challenge several of the bail
requests 140 and, despite its previous directions, the Appellate
Division did not stay any of the High Court Division orders.141
The State of Emergency was finally lifted on December 17,
2008, and on December 29, the AL led by Sheikh Hasina won
230 of 299 parliamentary seats in national elections that
independent observers considered to be generally free and
fair.142
III. RETURN TO DEMOCRACY AND THE EFFECT ON
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
With the return of democracy, the ACC’s investigations
during the Emergency-regime—regardless of their actual
merits—were discredited as politically motivated. Most of the
politicians and businessmen the ACC had prosecuted were
released on bail and many had been cleared of charges on
technicalities. The civilian politicians that took over in late 2008
had little incentive to continue a campaign that they did not
initiate and of which they were once the main target. Since

135. See id. at 77; Ashutosh Sarkar, Suspects Get Bail, Cases Stayed on Law Loopholes,
DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Aug. 18, 2008, at 1.
136. See AIN O SALISH KENDRA, supra note 109, at 66.
137. Khaleda Set to be Freed Today, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 11, 2008, at 1.
138. Hasina Returns Home Today, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Nov. 6, 2008, at 1.
139. See AIN O SALISH KENDRA, supra note 109, at 66.
140. Id. at 77.
141. Id. at 78.
142. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2177.
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2009, the democratically elected government has moved to
bring the ACC under its control and neutralize it altogether. In
February 2011, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s cabinet placed a
bill before Parliament to amend the Anti-Corruption Act so that
the ACC would be required to receive government permission
before filing any corruption cases against government
officials.143 The amendments faced opposition from some ruling
party lawmakers as well as from international donors and
development partners and the bill was subsequently tabled in
July 2011.144 In the meantime, the ACC has returned to its pre2007 form. In August 2011, it filed a new corruption case against
former prime minister and BNP chairperson Khaleda Zia. The
BNP has decried these charges as politically motivated and a
sign that the AL is orchestrating the ACC’s prosecutions to
attack political opponents.145 The ACC in Bangladesh today is
likely as compromised and as ineffective as the commission that
the military attempted to replace when it came to power during
the Emergency.
During the Emergency, Justice Abdur Rashid had warned
that the “[d]enial of [the] rule of law in the fight against
corruption would ultimately strengthen the climate of impunity
in the fertility of which corruption thrives in.”146 Indeed, at the
end of the Emergency the country now seems farther than ever
from having institutions capable of tackling corruption.
It is not just the ACC that has been tainted by association
with the military-backed regime. Ridwanul Hoque writes: “There
is no denying that particularly the senior judiciary in Bangladesh
incurred a crisis of public confidence during the recent
emergency” because of the Appellate Division’s perceived
failure to stand up to the excesses of the military-backed
government.147 The judiciary, which is seen by many as having its

143. Anti-Corruption Commission (Amendment) Act 2011 (Bangl.); see Clip ACC
Wings: Govt Nods, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 25, 2011, at 1.
144. Rashidul Hasan, JS Body for Stronger ACC, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), July 21, 2011,
at 1; Shakhawat Liton, Some Hope for ACC, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 20, 2011, at 1.
145. Khaleda Sued: BNP Says Govt. Out to Eliminate Opposition, DAILY STAR (Bangl.),
Aug. 9, 2011, at 1.
146. Iqbal Hasan Mahmood v. Bangladesh, (2008) 60 DLR (HCD) 88, 129
(Bangl.) (judgment delivered on Dec. 5, 2007).
147. Hoque, supra note 104, at 203.
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own deep challenges with corruption, 148 is now also seen as
unable to stand up against political pressures. In other words,
the ACC’s failed anticorruption efforts during the Emergency
not only ended up undermining the ACC itself, but arguably the
judiciary and its ability to contribute to anticorruption efforts in
the future.149
IV. IN CONTEXT: PAKISTAN AND THAILAND
Part of what is so striking about Bangladesh’s experience is
that it is not atypical. Many countries with politically active
militaries have seen the military use corruption charges against
civilian politicians as both a justification for and tool of military
rule. Indeed, politicians’ corruption is frequently the only point
of national agreement that the military can use to legitimize its
rule.150
Pakistan and Thailand provide recent examples of this
phenomenon. In both countries, corruption charges were used
to legitimize “good governance” coups and military rule and
courts played a key role in legitimizing this governance. The
Pakistani and Thai militaries sought court validation as evidence
that they were providing better, and in many ways, more “legal
governance” than the civilian politicians they replaced. In
Pakistan, the courts ultimately rebelled against this role, which
assisted in the downfall of military rule. In Thailand, judicial

148. See SC Names Probe Panel, BDNEWS24.COM, Jan. 23, 2011,
http://www.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=185318&cid=2.
149 . Moreover, after the restoration of democracy in 2008, the caretakergovernment system became suspect to the political class because it was used as a vehicle
to usher in the military regime. On June 29, 2011, after a Supreme Court order
declaring the Thirteenth Amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution, Constitution Act
of 1996, Act 1 of 1996, which established the caretaker system, “void and ultra vires the
Constitution,” it was repealed through a constitutional amendment by the AL—the
ruling party. The opposition party, BNP, boycotted the vote on the amendment,
however, arguing that dismantling the caretaker system would lead to rigged elections.
See Bangladesh Ends Caretaker Government Arrangement, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13973576; SC Sets Aside Caretaker Govt
System, BDNEWS24.COM, May 10, 2011, http://bdnews24.com/details.php?id=
195305&cid=2.
150. This is not to say that there are not other, often more central justifications
for military rule, such as paralyzing political deadlock or violence, but the role that
corruption charges play in justifying military rule cannot be underemphasized.
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decisions, and the judges themselves, became an integral part of
affirming the new military-created constitutional order.
Both cases show the central role of courts and corruption
charges in underpinning such coups. These examples mirror
the paradox found in Bangladesh: that anticorruption
advocates’ agendas can be appropriated by the military for
political interventions that not only undermine democracy but
also frequently retard anticorruption efforts.
A. Pakistan
Charges of corruption and regime change have long been
interlinked in Pakistan. General Ayub Khan, who ruled Pakistan
from 1958–69, justified the army’s intervention as a reaction to
the “political chicanery, intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency
manifest in every sphere of life.”151 He painted the army as the
only institution disciplined enough to save the nation from these
“evils” and lay the foundation for liberal democratic
constitutionalism.152
Ayub Khan’s script was followed repeatedly over the
following decades, as the Pakistani military frequently
intervened to weed out politicians it labeled as corrupt or
incompetent. For example, Benazir Bhutto was elected Prime
Minister in 1988 in the first democratic election in over a
decade, but she was removed twenty months later by President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan amidst charges of corruption. 153 Nawaz
Sharif then became prime minister, vowing to end the
corruption of Benazir Bhutto’s government. 154 However, just
three years later, in 1993, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan again
dissolved the democratically elected government on charges of
corruption, nepotism, and extrajudicial killings. 155 Benazir
Bhutto was reelected Prime Minister later that year, only to be
removed by President Farooq Laghari in 1996—yet again, on
corruption charges.156 Subsequently, Nawaz Sharif returned to
151.
(2006).
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Husain Haqqani, History Repeats Itself in Pakistan, 17 J. DEMOCRACY 110, 117
See id.
See id. at 119.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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power in 1997 with both Bhutto and Sharif trading accusations
of corruption against each other, which ultimately led to Bhutto
being convicted of corruption and going into self-imposed exile
in early 1999.157
After Sharif attempted to dismiss General Musharraf as
chief of the army and then refused to let his plane land in
Karachi, General Musharraf staged a successful coup in October
1999.158 In justifying the military’s claim to power, Musharraf
pointed to a weak economy, poor national morale, and
“corruption of horrendous proportion,” stating that “good
governance” was a prerequisite to solving the country’s
problems.159 Sharif was convicted of hijacking and terrorism for
prohibiting Musharraf’s plane from landing and was sentenced
to life in prison. He was later granted amnesty in exchange for
going into exile in Saudi Arabia. 160 In 2000, he was also
convicted of corruption for failing to pay taxes on a
helicopter. 161 When Sharif unsuccessfully tried to return in
September 2007 to run for Parliament, the government
reopened another corruption case against him.162 As a result,
both Sharif and Bhutto were out of the country during the
October 2007 presidential election, which Musharraf then easily
won.163
As in Bangladesh, Pakistan’s anticorruption agency became
a tool for the military under Musharraf’s regime, with Musharraf
filling its ranks with loyal members and the military personnel.
High profile opposition political figures, such as Yousaf Raza
Gilani and Asif Ali Zardari, who would later become prime
minister and president, respectively, spent several years in jail
during this time on corruption charges.164
157. See id. at 111.
158. See id. at 111, 119.
159. General Pervez Musharraf, supra note 4; see Weiner & LeVine, supra note 4.
160. See Haqqani, supra note 151, at 111.
161. See Sharif Accused in Helicopter Case, BBC NEWS, June 9, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/784095.stm.
162. See Pakistan Revives Corruption Case Against Sharif, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/world/asia/07iht-pakistan.1.7418984.html.
163. See Declan Walsh & Mark Tran, Bhutto Returns Home to Rapturous Welcome,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/18/
pakistan.benazirbhutto1.
164. See Jane Perlez, From Prison to Zenith of Politics in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2008, at A8; Gillani Convicted to 5-year RI, DAWN (Pak.), June 9, 2002,
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Although Pakistani courts have occasionally protected their
own jurisdiction and declared military coups illegal once they
ended, 165 for the most part they have acquiesced to military
forays into civilian rule.166 During the initial years of Musharraf’s
government the courts generally followed this pattern, rarely
challenging the military’s actions. Indeed, most sitting judges
took a loyalty oath to the Provisional Constitutional Order
underpinning the Musharraf regime.167 However, several years
into the military-backed regime, the Pakistani Supreme Court,
and, in particular, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry
began to challenge the government in a series of high-profile
cases. The court openly questioned the government’s policies
that led to the disappearances of suspected terrorists and the
privatization of a steel mill in which corruption was suspected.168
It even appeared likely that the court might rule that Musharraf
could not head the army and serve as the president at the same

http://archives.dawn.com/2002/06/09/top4.htm. Zardari was first put in jail in 1996
on charges of conspiring to attempt to kill Benazir Bhutto’s brother. In 1999, under
the Nawaz Sharif’s government, Zardari, while still in jail, was found guilty of accepting
kickbacks. He was then released on bail in 2004 in what many observers saw as an initial
attempt by the Musharraf government to reconcile with the Pakistan People’s Party. See
Celia W. Dugger, Pakistan Sentences Bhutto to 5 Years for Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
1999, at A4; Pakistan Police Re-arrest Zardari, BBC NEWS, Dec. 21, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4113611.stm.
165. Sh. Liaquat Hussain v. Pakistan, (1999) PLD (SC) 504 (Pak.) (limiting the
use of military tribunals to try accused terrorists); Asma Jilani v. Punjab, (1972) PLD
(SC) 139 (Pak.) (finding after General Yahya Khan had died that he had been an
illegal “usurper” of power and so his actions including the imposition of martial law
were unconstitutional).
166. Perhaps most infamously, the Supreme Court in Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief
of Army Staff, (1977) PLD (SC) 657 (Pak.), declared the imposition of martial law by the
military constitutional under the doctrine of necessity.
167. Some judges, however, did not swear this oath. Most notably, Chief Justice
Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui refused to swear the oath and was forced to resign instead.
Who Is Saeed-uz-Zaman-Siddiqui?, TIMES INDIA, Aug. 25, 2008, http://articles.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-08-25/pakistan/27940296_1_new-oath-pcoprovisional-constitutional-order.
168. See Watan Party & Pakistan Steel Peoples Worker Union. v. Pakistan, (2006)
PLD (SC) 697 (Pak.), Constitutional Petition No. 9 of 2006 & Civil Petition Nos. 345 &
394 of 2006, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/
CJD_Pakistan_Steel_Mills_Case.pdf; see also Justice (R) Rasheed A. Ravzi, The 2007
Lawyers Movement in Pakistan: Cases of Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan,
http://pakistan.ahrchk.net/chiefjustice/disappearance.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
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time. In response, Musharraf leveled charges of corruption
against the chief justice and suspended him in March 2007.169
Lawyers from across the country rallied to the chief justice’s
defense, sparking a nationwide movement to restore him to the
Supreme Court. Following this movement, he was reappointed
in July 2007. 170 However, after Musharraf won reelection in
October 2007, the Supreme Court stayed the election results
while it investigated whether Musharraf could have run for
office while also holding a position in the military.171 Faced with
this direct challenge to his rule, Musharraf declared an
emergency and dissolved the Supreme Court.172
Under pressure from domestic groups and international
powers, such as the United States, Musharraf passed a National
Reconciliation Ordinance (“NRO”) 173 in October 2007 that
granted amnesty to a substantial number of politicians and
bureaucrats, mostly for crimes relating to corruption. 174 This
paved the way for Benazir Bhutto to return from exile to contest
parliamentary elections.175 Some felt that Bhutto and her party
had cut a deal with the military, providing the military a civilian
face to oppose an increasingly popular and politically active
judiciary. The NRO was suspended by a panel of judges
including Chief Justice Chaudhry shortly after it was passed, but
after Chief Justice Chaudhry’s removal for the second time it was
revived by a panel of judges including the new Chief Justice
Abdul Hameed Dogar.176 General elections were then held in
February 2008, in the wake of the assassination of Pakistan
People’s Party (“PPP”) leader Benazir Bhutto—the PPP won177
After further agitation, Chief Justice Chaudhry and other
dismissed Supreme Court judges were eventually reinstated in

169. See ‘Passports of CJP’s Family Members Taken Away,’ DAWN (Pak.), Mar. 11, 2007,
http://archives.dawn.com/2007/03/11/nat1.htm.
170. Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal
Complex in Pakistan Under Musharraf, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 986 (2010).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. National Reconciliation Ordinance, Oct. 5, 2007 (Pak.).
174. See Ghias, supra note 170, at 1012.
175. See id.; Jane Perlez, Pakistan Strikes Down Amnesty for Politicians, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2009, at A8.
176. See Ghias, supra note 170, at 1014.
177. Id. at 1017.
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March 2009.178 The popular support received eventually led to
the judges’ reinstatement.179 In December 2009, the court under
Chief Justice Chaudhry declared the NRO unconstitutional,
throwing the country back into a constitutional crisis.180
Despite justifying the military’s coup in large part on
antigraft grounds, Pakistan’s Transparency International
ranking actually fell during Musharraf's rule, leading some
opposition leaders to call his tenure the most corrupt in
Pakistani history.181 Several army officers were seen as corrupt
but untouched by the government, while several civilian
politicians supposedly had corruption charges dropped in
exchange for supporting Musharraf in the 2002 elections.182 The
PPP’s 2008 proposed impeachment charge sheet against
President Musharraf (who resigned before it could be brought)
included hundreds of pages of charges of misconduct, financial
irregularities, and violations of the Constitution.183 Analysts like
Ayesha Siddiqa have argued that Pakistani military officers have
a strong economic motivation to stay involved in politics, where
they can profit from military controlled businesses, land
holdings, and official perks.184
Pakistan’s experience clearly parallels Bangladesh’s: in both
countries the military used corruption charges to seize power. As
in Bangladesh, General Musharraf’s fight against corruption in
Pakistan frequently became sidetracked by political
opportunism that then undermined both democratic and
corruption-fighting institutions. The judiciary in Pakistan,
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Azhar Masood, Pakistan’s Top Court Rules NRO Illegal, ARAB NEWS, Dec. 17,
2009, http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=129743&d=17&m=12
&y=2009.
181. See Amjad Mahmood, PML-N Candidates Vow to Restore Judiciary, DAWN (Pak.),
Feb. 7, 2008, http://archives.dawn.com/2008/02/07/top13.htm.
182. See, e.g., Owen Bennet Jones, Musharraf’s Corruption Crackdown ‘Failing,’ BBC
NEWS, Jan. 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1777889.stm; Who is the
Arbiter?, DAWN (Pak.), Dec. 13, 2007, http://archives.dawn.com/2007/12/13/ed.htm;
see also Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Pakistan: Entire Election Process Deeply
Flawed (Oct. 9, 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/2002/10/
pakistan-bck1009.pdf .
183. Amir Wasim, Musharraf May Face Corruption, Murder Charges, DAWN (Pak.),
Aug. 11, 2008, http://archives.dawn.com/2008/08/11/top1.htm.
184. See generally AYESHA SIDDIQA, MILITARY INC.: INSIDE PAKISTAN’S MILITARY
ECONOMY (2007).
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arguably even more than in Bangladesh, ultimately checked the
military’s claims on power as it challenged the corruption and
poor governance under Musharraf’s regime, and helped
instigate his departure.
B. Thailand
The Thai military also has a long history of using
corruption charges both as a justification and a tool for their
rule. As in the Bangladeshi and Pakistani cases, the Thai military
has relied on the courts to validate its rule. Indeed, judges have
now been made a central part of Thailand’s constitutional order
in the military-drafted constitution, along with other “good
governance” institutions, in order to help check the power of
civilian politicians and political parties.
Between the introduction of democracy in 1932 and 1992,
Thailand experienced nineteen coups, making coups the
primary vehicle through which Thai political leaders alternated
in power.185 As in Bangladesh and Pakistan, poor governance
and corruption were repeatedly invoked as reasons for these
coups, in effect becoming the currency of transition. As Clark
Neher notes: “By decrying civilian ineptness, corruption, and
malfeasance, and by proclaiming threats against the nation’s
sovereignty, military leaders were able to persuade the
bureaucratic polity that the military could do a better job of
governing.”186
As was the case in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Thai
military’s justifications for taking over have not always been
completely altruistic. For example, many commentators argued
that the real reason behind the 1991 coup was that the
government was attempting to increase civilian control over the
military, including the military’s large budget.187 The military
also has often been just as corrupt as the civilian government.
General Sunthorn Kongsompong, who led the 1991 coup and its
185. See Jon S.T. Quah, Combating Corruption in South Korea and Thailand, in THE
SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES, supra
note 8, at 245, 249.
186. Neher, supra note 6, at 195.
187. See, e.g., CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, A HISTORY OF THAILAND 245
(2009); Charles P. Wallace, Junta Frees Deposed Leader of Thailand, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1991, at A4.
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antigraft drives, 188 left an estate reported at around US$100
million when he died, despite spending his entire career in
government service.189
The 1997 Constitution, the first to be drafted by a popularly
elected assembly, was more democratic than its predecessors,
allowing for direct representation in both houses of the
bicameral assembly. 190 It also created a host of independent
agencies that were intended to fight graft, including a National
Counter Corruption Commission (“NCCC”) that replaced
earlier anticorruption institutions, which had proven mostly
ineffective.191
In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra was elected prime minister on
a populist platform, relying heavily on the rural vote from the
country’s poorer North and Northeast.192 A prominent business
tycoon, Thaksin had long been dogged by accusations of
corruption.193 In December 2000, the NCCC indicted Thaksin
for illegally registering his assets in the names of staff and
business colleagues in the run-up to the 2001 election.194 The
Constitutional Court then had to decide whether to affirm the
NCCC’s charges, which would have banned Thaksin from
politics. Confronted with the precarious predicament of
whether to throw Thaksin out of office immediately after his
party had been voted into power, it acquitted him in a
controversial eight to seven vote.195
Prime Minister Thaksin was subsequently accused of
influencing the guardian institutions that the 1997 Constitution
188. See Eric Pace, Sunthorn Kongsompong, 68; Thai General Led 1991 Coup, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1999, at C16.
189. See Robert Horn, Asia Buzz: Show Me the Money!, TIME, Mar. 21, 2001,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,103404,00.html?iid=fb_share.
190. Constitution of Thailand, Oct. 11, 1997, B.E. 2540; see Quah, supra note 185,
at 249.
191. Constitution of Thailand, Oct. 11, 1997, B.E. 2540, ch. X; see Quah, supra
note 185, at 249
192. See Tom Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 96; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, The Tragedy of
the 1997 Constitution, in DIVIDED OVER THAKSIN: THAILAND’S COUP AND PROBLEMATIC
TRANSITION 27, 32–33 (John Funston ed., 2009).
193. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 96.
194. See id; Pongsudhirak, supra note 192, at 32.
195. Summary Constitutional Court Ruling, No. 20/2544 (2001) (Thai), available
at http://english.constitutionalcourt.or.th/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_
view&gid=7&Itemid=10&lang=en; see Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 96; Pongsudhirak, supra
note 192, at 33.
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had created to limit political power. For instance, he was blamed
for using the appointment process, intimidation, and bribery to
undercut the Constitutional Court and NCCC.196
In early 2006, demonstrators led by the opposition party
alliance, People’s Alliance of Democracy, went to the streets in
Bangkok decrying what they saw as Thaksin’s often authoritarian
and corrupt administration.197 In particular, protestors criticized
the tax free sale of Thaksin’s US$1.9 billion telecommunications
company and alleged that he was involved in widespread voter
fraud. 198 To galvanize support, Thaksin called for elections.
Other parties boycotted the election, leading Thaksin’s party to
achieve an overwhelming victory in April 2006. As a result of the
boycott, Thaksin announced he would step aside as prime
minister and, in May 2006, the Constitutional Court declared
the elections invalid.199
In the face of continuing disagreement between the
political parties about what to do next, the military seized power
in September 2006 while Thaksin was visiting New York City.200
The military justified its takeover by citing social unrest and
corruption, stating that: “There has been social division like
never before. Each side has been trying to conquer another with
all possible means and the situation tends to intensify with
growing doubts on the administration amid widespread
reported corruption.”201
The military reconstituted the NCCC, replacing its
members, and giving it new powers to investigate some 10,000

196. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 96–97; Editorial, A System of Checks Remains
Essential, NATION (New York), Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/
opinion/A-system-of-checks-remains-essential-30062978.html.
197. See Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Thailand Since the Coup, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 140,
142–43 (2008).
198. See id.
199. Summary Constitutional Court Ruling, No. 9/2549 (2006) (Thai.); see Thai
Court Rules Election Invalid, BBC NEWS, May 8, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/4983600.stm.
200. Seth Mydans & Thomas Fuller, Army Takes Power While Thaksin is at UN, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/19/world/asia/19iht-thai.
2870024.html.
201. Text: Thai Coup-Leaders’ Statements, BBC NEWS, Sept. 19, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5361756.stm (quoting statements by leaders
of the military coup).
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charges of corruption under the Thaksin government.202 In May
2007, a reconstituted constitutional tribunal banned Thaksin
and other top party leaders from participating in politics for five
years under charges of election fraud. 203 Thaksin’s exile
mirrored the similar exiles of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
in Pakistan and the military’s attempt to exile former prime
ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh.
Thailand’s military-backed government wrote a new
constitution and approved it by referendum in early 2007,
officially relinquishing power after elections were held later that
year.204 The 2007 Constitution promotes guardian institutions to
limit the power of political parties even more so than the 1997
Constitution: setting up the Ombudsman’s Office, Counter
Corruption Commission, Audit Commission, Election
Commission, and Constitutional Court.205 Half the Senate was
appointed by a selection committee comprised of the heads of
these guardian institutions, including judges from the
Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme Administrative courts.206
Perhaps tellingly, many of the constitutional provisions
surrounding corruption, such as the disclosure of assets, are
explicitly binding on political functionaries, but make no
mention of military commanders.207
These guardian institutions seem premised on the idea that
politicians are incorrigibly corrupt and at the root of the
country’s problems, and thus, they deserve to have their powers
tempered. 208 Further, the institutions embody many
international “best practices,” thereby helping the military
202. See Aglionby, supra note 5.
203. Seth MyAdans & Thomas Fuller, Thai Protesters Ending Airport Blockades, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/world/asia/03thai.html?
th&emc=th.
204. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 100–02. Ironically, a reconstituted party filled
with Thaksin loyalists won the election. The reconstituted Constitutional Court would
eventually ban many of the leaders of this party and the party itself for election fraud in
the years to come. See id. at 102–03; Thailand Timeline 2001–2011, CNN, July 3, 2011,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/07/01/thailand.timeline/
index.html?iref=allsearch.
205. See Constitution of Thailand, Nov. 2007, B.E. 2550, ch.X, §§ 204–17, 229–53
(2007).
206. Id. ch.X, §§ 113–14.
207. Id. ch.X, § 259.
208. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 91–92 (commenting on guardian institutions in
the 2007 Constitution and the idea that political parties are corrupt).
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justify its rule as promoting “good governance” more
generally.209
In Bangladesh and Pakistan, the military took similar steps
to strengthen “good governance” while in power. For example,
in Bangladesh the military not only revitalized the country’s
ACC during the coup, it also passed a right-to-information law,
set up a human rights commission, and undertook reforms of
the judiciary and bureaucracy. 210 In Pakistan, President
Musharraf promulgated the Freedom of Information Ordinance
in 2002. 211 The Thai military ultimately went much further in
institutionalizing such efforts, attempting to use constitutional
design to tame the perceived excesses of politicians.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Emergency powers in developed democracies are
traditionally understood to be invoked to deal with a temporary
crisis until the normal political order can be restored.212 In the
developing world they rarely serve similar conservative ends. As
Victor Ramraj has observed, emergency powers in the
developing world are often utilized to try to transform a country
“to bring about the basic conditions of stability upon which a
constitutional order can take hold.” 213 In other words,
emergency powers are frequently used in developing countries
to attempt to create a stable democratic political order, instead of
protecting and restoring it.
The “good governance” coups in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and
Thailand follow this pattern. Military-backed governments
invoked the specter of unmitigated corruption as a moral failing
of civilian politicians that justified their intervention into
politics. The intervention’s goal was stated as eradicating this
209. See Interview with Nazmul Ahsan Kalimullah, supra note 102 (arguing that
the passage of the Right to Information Act and creation of a human rights commission
was done to appease the international donor community).
210. See ICG, supra note 55, at 12–17.
211. Freedom of Information Ordinance 2002 (Pak.).
212. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of
Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210, 212 (2004) (arguing that “modern”
emergency powers are modeled on the ancient model of the Roman dictatorship in
which the Roman Senate could direct the consuls to appoint a dictator for up to six
months in case of outside threat).
213. Ramraj, supra note 17, at 43.
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corruption so that the country can then travel uninhibited down
the road to democracy. Yet, these three examples also show that
there are serious reasons to doubt that the military can be any
more successful than civilian governments in fighting
corruption.214 Instead, anticorruption efforts are often used by
the military to consolidate their own power, undercutting
fledgling democratic institutions in the process and
perpetuating a climate of corruption and poor governance.
The military’s use of anticorruption efforts to gain political
power does not mean corruption should not be combated, nor
should one question its seriousness. Corruption is a drain on
economies. It delegitimizes democratic government—as its
invocation during military takeovers demonstrates—and it is an
injustice in its own right.
Mitigating the dangers involved in anticorruption
campaigns would entail a more evenhanded analysis of
corruption among politicians and within the military. However,
domestic and international anticorruption activists face a
dilemma on this point. If they try to paint a more balanced
picture by pointing out corruption within the military, they are
likely to face a promilitary, nationalist backlash that can
undermine their broader anticorruption efforts. If they do not
draw attention to corruption within the military, they help foster
a political environment in which political parties are seen as
corrupt, and the military a savior, creating an asymmetry that
promotes military intervention into civilian politics.
In focusing on the underanalyzed dangers of
anticorruption campaigns in countries with a politically active
military, this Article does not attempt to describe a
comprehensive strategy of how to best combat corruption in
these contexts. Still, our findings suggest at least three policy
recommendations to those wanting to fight corruption: (1) be
politically informed and astute, understanding the potential
dangers to democratic institutions posed by anticorruption
efforts, (2) focus reforms on institutions, processes, fair
elections, and prosecuting low-level actors, and (3) be openly
214. In Pakistan, Musharaff did not declare a state of emergency under the
Constitution, but instead placed the Constitution in abeyance. However, his
justifications and goals in doing so were arguably quite similar to those of the militaries
in Bangladesh and Thailand, which operated under official states of emergency.
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skeptical of the military, including implementing a bright line
rule against working with military or otherwise nondemocratic
governments to fight corruption.
Those who fight corruption must be politically savvy
enough to pick which efforts will build momentum in the fight
against corruption. Drawing on a wide variety of successful
anticorruption experiences both within their country and from
around the world can aid immeasurably in this effort. Doing so
requires not only looking at experiences where anticorruption
efforts have succeeded or failed at reducing corruption, but also
where and how they may have contributed to undercutting—or
strengthening—the broader democratic process.
To accomplish this, anticorruption activities need to be
highly sensitive to local context. Outside “best practices” and
international anticorruption rankings215 can inspire and provide
a knowledge base to local activists, but ultimately comparisons
should be limited within a country’s own history of combating
corruption and the specific forms of corruption that particularly
undermine “good governance” and democracy within each
country. Building such internal, country-specific anticorruption
benchmarks, rather than relying on externally imposed rankings
that are insensitive to local factors, should be the key focus for
anticorruption activists in developing countries.
Creating broad awareness amongst policymakers and
institutional actors about the potential of anticorruption efforts
to unintentionally empower the military and undercut civilian
democratic institutions can act as a powerful countervailing
force to prevent such outcomes. More specifically, judges should
be wary of corruption charges brought during a military
takeover and realize that in affirming these charges they are
aiding the military in their remake of the civilian political order.
As the case studies in this Article show, if judges do challenge
the military’s plans during a “good governance” coup, they may
exercise more power than they might initially assume. Still, there
are clear limits to the degree to which the courts can challenge
military rule, as the dismissal of Supreme Court judges by

215. See,
e.g.,
Corruption
Perception
Index,
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (last visited Feb. 16,
2012) (providing access to the Corruption Perception Indices from 1995 to 2011).
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General Musharraf in Pakistan demonstrates. Certainly not every
court can rely on protestors to take to the streets on its behalf,
but the military needs the validation of courts in these coups
more than judges might surmise.
Second, international and domestic activists can mitigate
the risks of overreach and bias in anticorruption efforts by more
broadly focusing reforms on institutions, processes, fair
elections, and prosecuting low-level bureaucrats. Stronger
institutions like the judiciary can then become new centers of
political power that not only can help promote anticorruption
efforts against the government, but also help protect against
military takeover. By targeting processes, like the government’s
contracting methods, or laws and policies that are particularly
susceptible to corruption, rather than individual political
personalities, anticorruption advocates mitigate the risk that
they will inadvertently undercut democratic institutions. 216 In
promoting truly competitive democratic elections, these
advocates help ensure that citizens will choose between
competing political parties rather than between civilian political
parties and military rule. Bringing low-level bureaucrats to task
for graft also makes a tangible difference in people’s lives while
slowly building a less forgiving environment for corruption.
Finally, anticorruption activists should refrain from
supporting anticorruption efforts during a military coup. These
efforts are likely to fail and are bound to become politicized at
the expense of civilian democratic leaders and institutions. If the
military does intervene in governance because of a breakdown
in law and order, it should adopt a limited mandate that does
not include a broader “good governance” or anticorruption
agenda. The international community can play an active role in
discouraging the military from adopting any such wider goals
that can be abused for political gain.
These recommendations are not meant to be exhaustive.
Rather, they show how an understanding of the risks posed by
anticorruption campaigns to democratic institutions can help to
reframe anticorruption strategies. Corruption in all its forms
should be fought against, but not without first understanding
216 . See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999), for a fuller description of this approach.
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and adjusting one’s strategy to mitigate the unintended adverse
consequences to democracy that such a fight can unleash.
CONCLUSION
Given the history of countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan,
and Thailand, we can no longer assume that all fights against
corruption promote democracy. Many of these efforts are
hijacked for political ends by the military and other selfinterested factions and we should not expect otherwise.
Anticorruption strategies need to better take this complex
reality into account. Claims that democratically elected leaders
should be replaced by supposedly “clean” military leaders or
neutral technocrats should be evaluated with due skepticism.

